NTP Amplification Discovery
October 27, 2014
NTP amplification attacks are a form of DDOS which use NTP servers to turn small requests into large responses which can be directed to the victims computer.
NTP amplification makes use of the MONLIST command. The MONLIST command directs the NTP server to respond with the last 600 IP addresses which used the server. By spoofing the source IP address of a MONLIST request, it will cause the NTP server to respond with the data to the spoofed IP address. You can imagine that with a large selection of NTP servers. If all were sent the same MONLIST request with the victims IP spoofed as the source address, it could be used as a method of DOS.
I obviously don’t condone doing this but i though it would be interesting to find how many NTP servers allow for this amplification of data. It is not by any means a new form of attack, so you would hope that many NTP servers dont respond to the MONLIST command.
How it works
To determine how many NTP servers respond to the MONLIST command i go through 2 seperate stages.
The first stage is to perform an initial scan on UDP port 123 (NTP port). I did this with the masscan tool using the following command:
./masscan -pU:123 -oX ntp.xml --rate 160000 126.96.36.199-188.8.131.52
My server only has very little bandwidth and therefore quite slow to scan. I have chosen to perform the test only on the 184.108.40.206-220.127.116.11 address range because of this. The range was simply chosen at random.
Once the scan has completed I’m left with an XML file which contains all the devices which were scanned which had port 123 open. For some reason, my masscan output file contained lots of duplicate entries for the same IP addresses. sometimes 100’s of records for each address. I created a simple python script capable of parsing large masscan output files and removes out all the duplicate entries. The script stores the single entries into a file called port123.txt.
The script i used to do this can be found below:
from lxml import etree port = None address = None parsedServers =  #Opens the file used to store single enteries. outputFile = open('port123.txt', 'a') #Iterates through the masscan XML file. for event, element in etree.iterparse('ntp.xml', tag="host"): for child in element: if child.tag == 'address': #Assigns the current iterations address to the address variable. address = child.attrib['addr'] if child.tag == 'ports': for a in child: #Assigns the current iterations port to the port variable. port = a.attrib['portid'] #is both port and IP address are present. if port > 1 and address > 1: #If the IP hasnt yet been added to the output file. if address not in parsedServers: print address #Write the IP address to the file. outputFile.write(address + '\n') #write the IP to the parsedServers list parsedServers.append(address) port = None address = None element.clear() outputFile.close() print 'End'
So once this script has run i i have an port123.txt file containing all IP addresses with port 123 open (With no duplicates).
The second stage is to parse the port123.txt file and determine if NTP is running on the port, and if it is, does it respond to the MONLIST command.
To achieve this i write a small python script which makes use of scapy.
I first import all the library’s ill need for the script and initialise some variables.
from scapy.all import * import thread
I then create the raw MONLIST request data string which will be sent to the NTP server. I’m not sure why but the servers wouldn’t respond back with data unless the request was of a certain size. I found anything over 60 bytes works ok. So the \x00 has been appended to the end 61 times.
rawData = "\x17\x00\x03\x2a" + "\x00" * 61
I then open both the output file used for writing the NTP servers which respond to a MONLIST request and the port123.txt file used for parsing the addresses found by masscan.
logfile = open('port123.txt', 'r') outputFile = open('monlistServers.txt', 'a')
I then define a function called sniffer. This function listens for incoming UDP data on port 48769. This port is the source port used when sending monlist requests. So any NTP server responding to a monlist request will respond on that port. the dst net address should by your IP address which the NTP server will respond back to. In this example i have set it to 18.104.22.168.
def sniffer(): sniffedPacket = sniff(filter="udp port 48769 and dst net 22.214.171.124", store=0, prn=analyser)
Any packets which the sniffer picks up which meet the UDP port 48769 requirements will be run though a function called analyser which i describe shortly.
Now the sniffer function is defined it is executed within a thread. This allows it to run in the background.
Next i iterate through the IP addresses found by masscan. For each address i send a UDP packet to port 123 from the destination port 48769 with the rawData string defined at the beginning of the script. So this loop essentially is spewing out MON_GETLIST requests to all the servers found by masscan.
for address in logfile: send(IP(dst=address)/UDP(sport=48769, dport=123)/Raw(load=rawData))
Any devices wich respond to the MON_GETLIST request will send data back which will be picked up by the sniffer running in the thread. This sniffer runs all received packets through the analyser function. The analyser function checks the length of the captured packet to ensure it is over 200 bytes in size. I found during my testing that if the NTP server doesn’t support the MONLIST command, the response is usually 60, 90 bytes in size, or non existent. If the server does respond to the MONLIST command however, the response is much larger, and consists of multiple packets. Usually around 480 byte per packet. So by checking if the received packet is larger than 200 bytes indicates that the MONLIST command works on the particular NTP server. This is obviously the case as one of the defining factors of using NTP amplification in this way is that the responses are large in size. If the response is greater than 200 bytes the IP address is written to the outputFile.
if len(packet) > 200: if packet.haslayer(IP): outputFile.write(packet.getlayer(IP).src + '\n')
It is quite common when a server responds to a monlist command that it returns multiple packets containing all the IP address data. (Depending on how many addresses it returns.) Because of this the outputFile often contains many duplicate addresses. as the sniffer captures all returned data. For this reason i run the output file through a sort and uniq to first group identical addresses and then remove duplicates using the following command:
sort monlistServers.txt | uniq
The result is a file containing all monlist enabled NTP servers.
The complete script as previously described can be found below:
from scapy.all import * import thread #Raw packet data used to request Monlist from NTP server rawData = "\x17\x00\x03\x2a" + "\x00" * 61 #File containing all IP addresses with NTP port open. logfile = open('output.txt', 'r') #Output file used to store all monlist enabled servers outputFile = open('monlistServers.txt', 'a') def sniffer(): #Sniffs incomming network traffic on UDP port 48769, all packets meeting thease requirements run through the analyser function. sniffedPacket = sniff(filter="udp port 48769 and dst net 126.96.36.199", store=0, prn=analyser) def analyser(packet): #If the server responds to the GET_MONLIST command. if len(packet) > 200: if packet.haslayer(IP): print packet.getlayer(IP).src #Outputs the IP address to a log file. outputFile.write(packet.getlayer(IP).src + '\n') thread.start_new_thread(sniffer, ()) for address in logfile: #Creates a UDP packet with NTP port 123 as the destination and the MON_GETLIST payload. send(IP(dst=address)/UDP(sport=48769, dport=123)/Raw(load=rawData)) print 'End'
As i mentioned previously, my bandwidth on my VPS is poor. So i have chosen to only perform the scan on the address range 188.8.131.52-184.108.40.206. If my maths is correct this is a total of 318,767,104 addresses (19 * 256 * 256 * 256).
The masscan found 253,994 devices with NTP port 123 open. This is 0.08% of the devices scanned.
Of the 253,994 devices, 7005 of them responded to the monlist command (2.76%).
If these values are equivalent to what would be found on a whole scan of the internet for monlist enabled NTP servers, it would mean that there are around 91,000 monlist enabled NTP servers.
VNC Authentication checking with Python
September 18, 2014
In this post i describe a small python script which can be used to determine the type of authentication used on a VNC Server. It uses the Scapy packet manipulation program to perform all the network data transmissions and retrievals. The program may not be perfect, but with my limited testing it seemed to work ok. To understand how the program works, i need to explain how a VNC client interacts with a VNC server. The RFB Protocol is used to make the connection to the server. By default this runs on TCP port 5900. I import Scapy into the python program, and save the IP address and port number into the variables IpAddress and port.
from scapy.all import * IpAddress = '192.168.1.13' port = 5900
It is important to run the following command before executing the script. This allows for the TCP handshake to complete.
iptables -A OUTPUT -p tcp –tcp-flags RST RST -j DROP
The first stage is to perform a TCP handshake to port 5900. I have set the timeout value of the TCP SYN packet to 2 seconds. This prevents the code running in an endless loop if the VNC server dosn’t respond with a SYNACK.
If the server does respond with a SYNACK, the SYNACK packet is stored in the synack variable.
syn = IP(dst=IpAddress)/TCP(dport=port, flags='S') synack = sr1(syn, timeout=2)
I then finish the TCP handshake with an ACK, and send it to the VNC server.
ack = IP(dst=IpAddress)/TCP(dport=port, flags='A', seq=1, ack=synack.seq + 1) send(ack)
Now the TCP handshake is complete, the VNC server should respond with a protocol version message. This is a message which tell the client the version number supported by the server. This message needs to be captured. To do this i then run a sniffer on the interface, checking for all data incoming from the VNC servers IP address.
filter = 'host ' + IpAddress vnc = sniff(filter=filter, count=1,timeout=2, prn=vncCheck)
All data that matches the filter is sent to the vncCheck function for further processing. The first stage of this function is to verify that the packet it received is indeed a protocol version message. An example of a protocol message can be seen below:
All protocol version packets are in the format of ‘RFB xxx.yyy\n’. xxx and yyy are the protocol version numbers. Because of this, the best method of determining if the packet is a protocol version message is by simply checking if the packet payload consists of the string ‘RFB’.
if 'RFB' in packet.load:
When the protocol version message is received. The client then sends a client protocol version. This informs the server the protocol version which the client supports and will be used for the communication. In my case i create a the client protocol version packet with the version payload of ‘RFB 003.003\n’.
clientVersion = IP(dst=IpAddress)/TCP(dport=port, flags='AP', seq=1, ack=packet.seq + 1)/'RFB 003.003\n'
The client protocol version is then sent to the VNC server. The response back from the VNC server is saved into the supportedtypesPacket variable. This response contains the type of authenticaion the server uses in the form of a hexadecimal value. For example, from the following screenshot you can see the security type response 00 00 00 02 highlighted at the bottom.
The type of authentication the VNC server uses is defined by the last byte. In this case the value 02. The program then extracts this byte and stores it in the variable authenticationType.
authenticationType = str(ord(supportedtypesPacket.load)) + str(ord(supportedtypesPacket.load)) authenticationType = int(authenticationType)
Finally, a simple IF statement is used to compares the value to the matching authentication type.
if authenticationType == 00: print IpAddress + ' uses an Invalid Authentication type of ' + str(authenticationType) elif authenticationType == 01: print IpAddress + ' uses No Authentication' elif authenticationType == 02: print IpAddress + ' uses VNC Authentication' elif authenticationType == 05: print IpAddress + ' uses RA2 Authentication' elif authenticationType == 06: print IpAddress + ' uses RA2ne Authentication' elif authenticationType == 16: print IpAddress + ' uses Tight Authentication' elif authenticationType == 17: print IpAddress + ' uses Ultra Authentication' elif authenticationType == 18: print IpAddress + ' uses TLS Authentication' elif authenticationType == 19: print IpAddress + ' uses VeNCrypt Authentication' elif authenticationType == 20: print IpAddress + ' uses GTK-VNC SASL Authentication' elif authenticationType == 21: print IpAddress + ' uses MD5 Hash Authentication' elif authenticationType == 22: print IpAddress + ' uses Colin Dean XVP Authentication' else: print IpAddress + ' uses an Unknown Authentication type of: ' + str(authenticationType)
For completeness, you can find below the complete code with indentation and comments included.
from scapy.all import * #Must run the following command before executing this script. Allows for the TCP handshake to take place. #iptables -A OUTPUT -p tcp --tcp-flags RST RST -j DROP #IP and Port of the VNC server IpAddress = '192.168.1.13' port = 5900 #Function which is executed on each packet. def vncCheck(packet): #Checks that the packet is a server protocol version response. (Should contain 'RFB' if it is. if packet.haslayer('Raw'): if 'RFB' in packet.load: #Creates and sends a clientVersion response. The security type response from the VNC server is saved in the #Variable supportedtypesPacket clientVersion = IP(dst=IpAddress)/TCP(dport=port, flags='AP', seq=1, ack=packet.seq + 1)/'RFB 003.003\n' supportedtypesPacket = sr1(clientVersion) #Extract the HEX value from the security type response. authenticationType = str(ord(supportedtypesPacket.load)) + str(ord(supportedtypesPacket.load)) authenticationType = int(authenticationType) #Match the value with the correct authentication type. print IpAddress + ' Uses an Authentication type of : ' + str(authenticationType) if authenticationType == 00: print IpAddress + ' uses an Invalid Authentication type of ' + str(authenticationType) elif authenticationType == 01: print IpAddress + ' uses No Authentication' elif authenticationType == 02: print IpAddress + ' uses VNC Authentication' elif authenticationType == 05: print IpAddress + ' uses RA2 Authentication' elif authenticationType == 06: print IpAddress + ' uses RA2ne Authentication' elif authenticationType == 16: print IpAddress + ' uses Tight Authentication' elif authenticationType == 17: print IpAddress + ' uses Ultra Authentication' elif authenticationType == 18: print IpAddress + ' uses TLS Authentication' elif authenticationType == 19: print IpAddress + ' uses VeNCrypt Authentication' elif authenticationType == 20: print IpAddress + ' uses GTK-VNC SASL Authentication' elif authenticationType == 21: print IpAddress + ' uses MD5 Hash Authentication' elif authenticationType == 22: print IpAddress + ' uses Colin Dean XVP Authentication' else: print IpAddress + ' uses an Unknown Authentication type of: ' + str(authenticationType) #Creates and sends a TCP SYN packet to the VNC server. (Step 1 of the TCP handshake) syn = IP(dst=IpAddress)/TCP(dport=port, flags='S') synack = sr1(syn, timeout=2) #Creates and sends an ACK packet is response to the servers SYNACK. (Step 3 of the TCP handshake) ack = IP(dst=IpAddress)/TCP(dport=port, flags='A', seq=1, ack=synack.seq + 1) send(ack) #Sniffs incoming network data after the initial TCP handshake. Sends the packets to the vncCheck function. filter = 'host ' + IpAddress vnc = sniff(filter=filter, count=1,timeout=2, prn=vncCheck)
Hacking the TalkTalk HUAWEI HG523a Router Part 2
July 9, 2014
For part 1 please Click Here.
OK. So i have access to the routers busybox console. I found by typing the
busybox command it displays all the commands available on the device.
# busybox BusyBox vv1.9.1 (2012-03-05 00:16:52 CST) multi-call binary Copyright (C) 1998-2007 Erik Andersen, Rob Landley, Denys Vlasenko and others. Licensed under GPLv2. See source distribution for full notice. Usage: busybox [function] [arguments]... or: function [arguments]... BusyBox is a multi-call binary that combines many common Unix utilities into a single executable. Most people will create a link to busybox for each function they wish to use and BusyBox will act like whatever it was invoked as! Currently defined functions: [, [[, arp, ash, cat, chmod, chown, cp, date, echo, ftpget, ftpput, halt, ifconfig, init, kill, killall, linuxrc, ln, ls, mcast, mkdir, mknod, mount, netstat, nslookup, ping, poweroff, ps, reboot, rm, route, sh, sleep, test, top, traceroute, umount, vconfig, wget #
As you can see the amount of commands available is quite small. Looking at some other busybox console outputs posted online there are usually many more programs available to run. There is a great page found here which details many of the programs or ‘applets’ that busybox can have installed and describes what they are for. Many of the commands available on the HG523a aren’t of much use.
My next aim is to try and extract the filesystem from the device. Allowing me to analyse it more easily on another computer with more tools available.
I tried to mount a directory over nfs but i found out that nfs isnt supported on the device. If you run the command cat /proc/filesystems you can check what file systems are supported. If NFS is listed in this output it may have been an option.
# cat /proc/filesystems nodev rootfs nodev bdev nodev proc nodev sockfs nodev pipefs nodev tmpfs squashfs nodev ramfs #
My next attempt involved copying the device file which contains the file system. I first checked the file system type. This information is important later on.
# cat /proc/mounts rootfs / rootfs rw 0 0 /dev/root / squashfs ro 0 0 none /dev tmpfs rw 0 0 /proc /proc proc rw 0 0 none /var tmpfs rw 0 0 none /tmp tmpfs rw 0 0 none /mnt tmpfs rw 0 0
From this output you can see the root filesystem is running on squashfs.
I next went on to find where the file system is stored. /dev/root dosnt exist which was slightly confusing.
# cat /proc/mtd dev: size erasesize name mtd0: 00010000 00001000 "boot" mtd1: 00001000 00001000 "flag" mtd2: 003c0000 00001000 "main" mtd3: 0002d000 00001000 "config" #
This mtd file showed that the router software is split into 4 parts.
Boot, which i assume is the boot loader.
Flag, which I’m note sure.
Main, which i assume is the file system. especially considering it is the largest in size.
Config. Which again, I’m not entirely sure what is it. But the one of interest is the one called main on mtd2.
Now. looking in the dev directory you can see there are all the mtd devices.
# cd /dev # ls initctl mtdblock6 mtd4 tty1 kmem I2S ram2 mem mtdblock5 mtd3 tty2 port boardled ram3 ttyp2 mtdblock4 mtd2 tty3 null wlchr adsl0 ttyp1 mtdblock3 mtd1 tty4 ac0 ttyUSB0 ttyp0 mtdblock2 mtd0 ppp acl0 ttyUSB1 ptyp2 mtdblock1 ptmx printer0 urandom ttyUSB2 ptyp1 mtdblock0 ttyS0 console gpio ttyUSB3 ptyp0 mtd6 tty bhal hwnat0 ram0 zero mtd5 tty0 commondrv i2cM0 ram1 #
If you remember when i typed in the busybox command at the beginning, there was a command called ftpput. This ftpput command is the way I’m going to extract the firmware from the device.
# ftpput BusyBox vv1.9.1 (2012-03-05 00:16:52 CST) multi-call binary Usage: ftpput [options] remote-host Download or upload via FTP. Options: -g Download -s Upload -v Verbose -u Username to be used -p Password to be used -l Local file path -r Remote file path -P Port to be used, optional -B Bind local ip, optional -A Remote resolved ip, optional -b Transfer start position -e Transfer length -m Max transfer size -c Compress downloaded file #
So i opened up my Kali linux virtual machine and installed an FTP server. I then attempted to upload using ftpput on the router. One of the difficulties i had with this program is that it was very unforgiving with the syntax. It wouldn’t respond stating the mistake you made with the input. But in the end after some searching i found the correct command.
ftpput -s -v -u ftpuser -p toor -l /dev/mtdblock2 -r /ftpdir/mtdblock2 192.168.1.3
ftpuser is the username that has write access on my ftp server on the Kali virtual machine.
toor is the password
/dev/mtdblock2 is the file I’m copying.
/ftpdir/mtdblock2 is the location on the ftp server the file is saved.
192.168.1.3 is the FTP server IP address
So now i have mtdblock2 on my virtual machine.
The next stage is to extract the firmware from mtdblock2. I did attempt initially to try and mount the device directly hoping it would work. But sadly it didn’t.
root@kali:~/Desktop/talktalk# mount -t squashfs mtdblock2 /mnt mount: wrong fs type, bad option, bad superblock on /dev/loop0, missing codepage or helper program, or other error In some cases useful info is found in syslog - try dmesg | tail or so
I then went on to run binwalk on it.
root@kali:~/Desktop/talktalk# binwalk mtdblock2 DECIMAL HEX DESCRIPTION ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 0 0x0 Squashfs filesystem, big endian, lzma signature, version 3.0, size: 2072620 bytes, 182 inodes, blocksize: 65536 bytes, created: Sun Mar 4 16:18:17 2012 2076736 0x1FB040 LZMA compressed data, properties: 0x5D, dictionary size: 33554432 bytes, uncompressed size: 3827500 bytes
As you can see, it is showing that there is a Squashfs filesystem right at the start of the file. Which confirms the findings when i ran cat /proc/mount on the device.
I then went on to download firmware-mod-kit in an attempt to unsquash the filesystem. It is an insanely awesome set of scripts which goes through all the unsquashfs versions and attempts to extract the firmware. Once downloaded and installed i ran the unsquashfs_all.sh script against mtdblock2 and waited.
Eventually, version squashfs-3.2-r2-hg612-lzma/unsquashfs successfully extracted the firmware. I can browse the directories and view the files like i could on the device. But now have much more freedom in what i want to do next.
root@kali:~/Desktop/talktalk/squashfs-root/bin# ls adslcmd busybox cms ddnsc echo ipcheck klog mini_upnpd netlogger ripd sntp tr111 wlancmd adslctrl cat console dhcpc equipcmd iptables ln mkdir netstat rm startbsp umount wscd ash chmod cp dhcps ethcmd iwcontrol log mknod ping sh swapdev upg zebra atmcmd chown cwmp dns igmpproxy iwpriv ls mount pppc siproxd tc upnp brctl cli date ebtables ip kill mic mpoad ps sleep telnetd web
I have made uploaded a copy of the file system here if anyone wants to download it and take a look. Please let me know if you find anything interesting.
Make sure to check back next time as i go even deeper into the TalkTalk HUAWEI HG523a Router.
Hacking the TalkTalk HUAWEI HG523a Router
June 11, 2014
I got my hands on a TalkTalk HUAWEI HG523a. This is one of the routers distributed to TalkTalk subscribers. This is my first attempt of doing any kind of embedded device analysis so i decided it would be beneficial to document the steps i take. As i progress i will write new posts detailing what i have done.
Before i start, one of the best resources i have found in working through this project is devttys0.com. A lot of the things i do in this post i found in that blog.
OK, so the first thing i decided to do was to open the router and try to find some kind of serial interface that would allow me to get a shell on the device. The picture below shows what the top of the PCB looks like.
Looking at the board you can see a a grouping of five pins that look quite like a serial port. You would expect to find a transmit, receive, power and ground pins to connect to. The next step to to identify which pin is which. I did this using a multimeter.
The first pin to identify is ground. To do this i switched the multimeter to continuity mode. This checks if there is an electrical connection between the two probes. I attached one of the multimeter probes to the power socket casing (which is a known ground point) and the other on each of the pins in turn. You would expect the multimeter to show there’s continuity if it is connected to two ground pins. In this case it showed continuity on pin 4. So this is the ground pin.
The next step is to identify the transmit pin. You would expect when the router is powered it it will display boot messages and other information on the serial interface. This kind of behavior can be seen on the multimeter as an erratic voltage. So to find the transmit pin simply connect one probe to ground as always, and the other to each pin in turn. The pin that exhibits an unstable voltage that constantly changes is likely the transmit pin. In this case the transmit pin is pin 5.
With this router i couldn’t clearly identify the power and receive pins. Both pin 1 and pin 3 has a 3.3 volt power and pin 2 was completely dead. So all i did was take a guess. I found that pin 1 is the receive pin and pin 3 is the power pin.
the next step is to connect to this serial interface. I used a USB-UART adapter i bought off ebay for a whopping £1.19. So i connect the USB-UART adapter to the pins on the router and power it up. I connect to the COM port using putty and was greeted with the following:
From my limited understanding i believed this to be because the BAUD rate was incorrect. So i found a very cool python script called baudrate which allows you to easily find the correct baud rate for the interface your trying to connect to. You just enter the command and use the arrow keys to cycle through the baud rates until you find the correct one. (The correct one will display the boot-up text correctly.)
root@kali:~/Documents/baudrate-1.0/src# python baudrate.py /dev/ttyUSB0 Starting baudrate detection on /dev/ttyUSB0, turn on your serial device now. Press Ctl+C to quit. @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ Baudrate: 115200 @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ *******____________skb_________size 224 /proc/FastPath created Realtek MCast FastPath /proc/mc_FastPath created NET: Registered protocol family 1 NET: Registered protocol family 17 Bridge LAN vlan registered Ebtables v2.0 registered 802.1Q VLAN Support v1.8 Ben Greear <firstname.lastname@example.org> All bugs added by David S. Miller <email@example.com> VFS: Mounted root (squashfs filesystem) readonly. Freeing unused kernel memory: 108k freed init started: BusyBox vv1.9.1 (2012-03-05 00:16:52 CST) starting pid 69, tty '': '/etc/init.d/rcS' rcs RCS DONE starting pid 72, tty '': '/bin/sh' BusyBox vv1.9.1 (2012-03-05 00:16:52 CST) built-in shell (ash)
From this output you can see that at a baud rate of 115200 the text displays normally. So the serial interface uses a 115200 baud rate. As it turns out this is quite common.
Once the boot up has finished i hit enter on the keyboard and it displayed a login prompt. I entered the default user name and password of admin and admin which was printed on a sticker on the router. This then logged me into the routes serial interface.
As you can see from the screenshot you are entered into a ATP command line interface. Looking through the options of this interface it seems quite limited as to what you can do. Some things of interest include:
By typing ‘debug display cwmp’ it allows you to view details for the TR-069 application layer protocol used for the remote updating of router firmware.
ATP>debug display cwmp ACS URL: http://acs.talktalk.co.uk:7547/ACS-server/ACS User Name: Password: Connection Request User Name: userid Connection Request Password: cRP#21530316207S2C088299 Connection Request URL: Inform Enable: 1 Inform Period: 86400
You also have the option for setting the authentication type used for cwmp.
ATP>debug set cwmp authtype ? 0: none; 1: basic; 2: digest; 3: adapt
And to set the password for TR-064 with:
ATP>debug set tr064 pwd mypassword123 ATP>
Going through all the other options i couldn’t find many other useful commands. I decided to do a bit of googling to see if there was any hidden commands that could be used. I found a blog post where someone said to enter the shell command to bring up a Busybox shell. I gave this a try and it worked.
BusyBox vv1.9.1 (2012-03-05 00:16:52 CST) built-in shell (ash) Enter 'help' for a list of built-in commands. # ls var usr tmp sbin proc mnt lib init etc dev bin #
As it turns out. Looking at the same blog post its possible to get the same level of access by just telnetting into the router and entering the admin admin login details i used. But i suppose what i have done is good practice, and a lot of fun 🙂
Make sure you check back for what i attempt next with this TalkTalk router.